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"IT'S A LITTLE KNOWN FACT" THAT COPYRIGHT LAW IS
IN CONFLICT WITH THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Madeline O'Connor*
INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit decided the case of Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,' which in-
volved a conflict between the state statutory and common law right of
publicity and federal copyright law. 2 The decision in Wendt contin-
ues to be cited by many circuits, even though the court's resolution
of the conflict was not clear, and leaves behind the question of
whether actors are able to unfairly exploit the right of publicity to lay
claim to characters that are not their own. In Wendt, actors George
Wendt and John Ratzenberger sued Host International, Inc. ("Host")
in district court claiming their trademark and publicity rights were vi-
olated when Host, without their permission, placed animatronic ro-
botic figures ("robots") based upon their likenesses in airport bars,
modeled upon the television show Cheers.4 The court had to decide
whether the California statutory and common law right of publicity
prevented Host from using robots based upon the actors' likenesses,s
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. I would like to
thank many special people: first, Professor Rena Seplowitz for her constant support and as-
sistance; second, Professors Melniker and Barshay, who have not only helped me throughout
my education, but have also guided me in reshaping my future; third, my good friend James
Lucarello, Editor-in-Chief of the Touro Law Review, and one of the finest human beings I
have had the pleasure of knowing; and, finally, I would like to thank my loving parents,
children, family, friends, and teachers who have stood beside me and helped me succeed in a
very difficult time in my life.
Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc. (WendtI), 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 809.
See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1025 (3d Cir. 2008); McBee v.
Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 114 (1st Cir. 2005); Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265
F.3d 994, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001); Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 623 (6th
Cir. 2000).
4 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 808-09.
s Id. at 809.
351
1
O'Connor: It's a Little Known Fact
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOURO LA WREVIEW
and whether the use of their likenesses created a likelihood of confu-
sion that Wendt and Ratzenberger were endorsing Host's products, in
violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.6 Also confronting the
court were the arguments of Host and Paramount Pictures Corpora-
tion ("Paramount") that the appearance of the robots invoked the cha-
racters "Norm" and "Cliff," rather than Wendt and Ratzenberger as
individuals, rendering the plaintiffs' right of publicity claims merit-
less.' Further, Host and Paramount argued that the characters
"Norm" and "Cliff' were the property of Paramount based upon Pa-
ramount's copyrights in these characters, and, therefore, plaintiffs
had no claim under the right of publicity.8
The court was placed in the difficult position of reconciling
the conflicting rights of copyright law and the right of publicity.
While Paramount had copyright ownership of the characters "Norm"
and "Cliff," and licensed the right to create the robotic figures to
Host, it was also true that the characters "Norm" and "Cliff' were
developed through the unique personalities and personae of the actors
George Wendt and John Ratzenberger. Undeniably, both plaintiffs
and defendants had valid rights to the same intellectual property: Pa-
ramount and Host to the fictional characters "Norm" and "Cliff' that
they had created and protected under copyright law, and Wendt and
Ratzenberger to their likenesses in their roles as characters "Norm"
and "Cliff," which are protected by the right of publicity.
This Comment will analyze Section 102 of the Copyright Act,
the right of publicity in common law and as codified in state statutes,
and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and the analyses and applica-
tion of these laws by different circuits. Further, this Comment will
suggest alternative tests, modeled upon trademark law, that courts
may use in the future in similar situations to reach more equitable de-
terminations.
6 Id. at 812; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West 2006).
7 Wendt v. Host, Int'l. Inc. (Wendt l), Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
5464, at *7 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1995). Paramount was an applicant in intervention. Id. at *1.
' Id at *7.
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I. THE COMPETING LAWS
A. Copyright Law
Copyright law's ultimate purpose is to "enrich[] the general
public through access to creative works," and to promote creativity of
authors and inventors.9 Section 102 of the Copyright Act protects
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or oth-
erwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of machine or
device."'o The copyright in a work "vests initially in the author or
authors of the work."" Thus, copyright law provides protection to an
author of an original work that is set forth in tangible form.12 A work
is considered original when "it is the independent creation of its au-
thor," and "is creative if it embodies some modest amount of intellec-
tual labor."' 3 Only a small degree of creativity is necessary for copy-
right protection. 14
Further, Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides copyright
holders with "the exclusive right[] . . . to prepare derivative works
based upon the[ir] copyrighted work." 5 Inherent in this right is the
ability of copyright holders to take advantage of markets beyond the
original market which featured the work. 16  The copyright holders
may also grant licenses of their copyrighted work to others to create
derivative works.17 In the case of Wendt, Paramount had obtained
9 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).
'o 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2009). See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
" 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(a) (West 2009).
I2 See id.
13 See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663,
668 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (stating that an original work is one that
is "independently created by the author").
14 Orioles, 805 F.2d at 668.
" 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2009). Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides that the
public at large has "the right to make 'fair use' parodies," as well as other transformative
works. White v. Samsung (White II), 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting). See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). See also 17
U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2009).
16 Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovi-
sual Characters, 20 CARDOzo L. REv. 355, 387 (1998).
17 White II, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(2).
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copyright protection for their characters "Norm" and "Cliff' and then
had licensed the right to create a derivative work, the robotic figures,
to Host.'8 Thus, Host and Paramount claimed that copyright laws
protected their actions.1
B. Trademark Law
Trademark law also provides for a claim of unfair competition
in right of publicity types of cases. 20 These claims arise when a de-
fendant's use of a celebrity's persona causes likelihood of confusion
as to whether the celebrity endorsed the defendant's product.2' In the
case of Wendt, Wendt and Ratzenberger argued that Host's robots
created a likelihood of confusion that Wendt and Ratzenberger en-
dorsed Host's airport bars.22
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides for a civil action
against
[a]ny person who, or in connection with any goods or
services, ... uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, . . .
which - (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person ... 23
Courts analyze whether a likelihood of confusion exists by applying
the following factors: " '1) strength of the plaintiffs mark; 2) rela-
tedness of the goods; 3) similarity of the marks; 4) evidence of actual
confusion; 5) marketing channels used; 6) likely degree of purchaser
care; 7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8) likelihood of
expansion of the product lines.' ,24
8 Wendt I, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *7.
19 Id.
20 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
21 White v. Samsung (White 1), 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992).
22 WendtI, 125 F.3d at 811.
23 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
24 Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting White 1, 971 F.2d
354 [Vol. 26
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C. The Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is intended "to protect the commercial
interest of celebrities in their identities." 25 The assumption is that a
celebrity's identity is valuable in the endorsement of products, and
the celebrity should be able to prevent any "unauthorized commercial
exploitation of that identity."26 In the case of Wendt, Wendt and Rat-
zenberger argued that their publicity rights were violated by Host's
use of the robotic figures, which were based upon the likenesses of
Wendt and Ratzenberger.27
1. California Civil Code Section 3344
California Civil Code provides, in relevant part, that
[a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name,
voice, signature, photograph or likeness, in any man-
ner, . . . for purposes of advertising or selling, . . .
without such person's prior consent . . . shall be liable
for any damages sustained by the person or persons in-
jured as a result thereof.28
Thus, under California law, an individual's right of publicity is vi-
olated when "another appropriates for his advantage the individual's
name, image, identity or likeness." 29 The law requires a deliberate
use of the individual's " 'name, photograph, or likeness for purposes
of advertising or solicitation of purchases.' "3o Additionally, the
courts require a direct connection " 'between the use and the com-
mercial purpose.' ,31 Damages are awarded as either "seven hundred
fifty dollars [] or the actual damages suffered" as a result of the unau-
thorized use-whichever is greater-and any additional profits that
at 1400). The circuits phrase these factors differently.
25 Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983).
26 Id.
27 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 809.
28 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997).
29 Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
30 Id. (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
31 Id. (quoting Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 at 347).
2010] 355
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are not considered when computing the actual damages.32 The statute
provides for an award of punitive damages and attorney's fees to the
damaged party.
2. California Common Law Right of Publicity
California also has a common law right of publicity that pro-
vides protection against appropriation of a person's name or like-
ness.34 To plead this common law right of publicity, a plaintiff must
allege: "1) the defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity; 2) the ap-
propriation of plaintiffs name or likeness to defendant's advantage,
commercially or otherwise; 3) lack of consent; and 4) resulting in-
jury."
California's common law right of publicity provides greater
protection than California Civil Code Section 3344, in that, in addi-
tion to protecting against "the knowing use of a plaintiffs name or
likeness for commercial purposes[,] . . . . [i]t also protects against ap-
propriations of the plaintiffs identity by other means."36 For exam-
ple, the common law right of publicity also protects an individual
from misappropriation of his identity,37 voice,3 8 and even his ve-
hicle. 39 Thus, California's common law right of publicity protects
more aspects of an individual's persona than does California's statu-
tory right of publicity.
D. Summary of Rights Protected
Whereas copyright law protects an individual's creative ef-
forts by preventing the unlawful appropriation of his original works,40
unfair competition under trademark law safeguards against the mi-
sappropriation of an individual's persona that creates the false im-
32 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a).
34 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 811 (citing Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346).
3 Id. (citing Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347).
36 Id.; see also Downing, 265 F.3d at 1001 (noting that the remedies provided under the
statutory right of publicity are complementary to the remedies provided under the common
law).
3 Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 415 (9th Cir. 1996).
38 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
3 Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974).
40 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106.
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pression of sponsorship of another's goods or services.4 ' Similar to
trademark law, which, in part, prohibits the misappropriation of an
individual's persona for commercial advantage,42 the right of publici-
ty guards an individual from having his identity misappropriated for
commercial advantage. 43 In sum, copyright law protects an individu-
al's creative efforts,44 while trademark's unfair competition laws and
a state's right of publicity laws secure the individual's persona and
identity.45
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF CALIFORNIA'S STATE LAWS
California's right of publicity laws are "subject to preemption
under the [S]upremacy [C]lause of the United States Constitution" if
the laws conflict with federal statutes or obstruct the execution of the
" 'full purposes and objectives of Congress.' ,46 Section 301(a) of
the Copyright Act expressly proscribes state legislation in the area of
copyright law by stating that
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of au-
thorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter of copyright
as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created
before or after that date and whether published or un-
published, are governed exclusively by this title. The-
reafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common
law or statutes of any State.4 7
Therefore, in order for the Copyright Act to preempt California's
state laws, the claimed infringement "must be [of] a work fixed in a
41 White II, 989 F.2d at 1400 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
42 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
43 WendtII, 125 F.3d at 811.
4 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a).
45 See White II, 989 F.2d at 1400 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Carson, 698 F.2d at 835.
4 Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 631
(1982)).
47 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (West 2009).
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tangible medium of expression" that falls within the scope of copy-
right protection, and the right alleged under California's laws must
correspond to the exclusive rights included in Section 106 of the
Copyright Act.48
In situations in which an actor alleges a right of publicity
claim, the actor may assert the claim as an infringement of the actor's
human persona, or as an infringement of the actor's fictional charac-
ter.49 An actor's human persona refers to the "actor's unique person-
al attributes such as name, voice, likeness, physical mannerisms, and
personality traits," but not general characteristics such as "sex, size,
or hair color."50  The Copyright Act does not preempt California's
state rights regarding human personae, because the actor's human
persona does not fall within the confines of the Copyright Act."' A
human persona is not "a work of authorship," but is rather a work of
nature.52 Further, a human persona is not " 'fixed in a tangible me-
dium' " because it changes over time. 3
A fictional persona, on the other hand, refers to the abstract
character that is produced separately by writers, and includes the
"character's general physical appearance, personality traits, and phys-
ical mannerisms" but not any of the actor's distinctive personal
attributes. 54 Fictional personae fall within the scope of the Copyright
Act because they are creations of writers, and thus are "works of au-
thorship";5 5 and they are generally "fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression" because the embodiment of a fictional persona on film is "
'sufficiently permanent . . . to permit it to be perceived [or] repro-
duced ... for a period of more than transitory duration.' "56 Since a
4 Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649 (citing Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes and Gardner,
Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1987); Trenton v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 865 F. Supp.
1416, 1427-28 (C.D. Cal. 1994)).
49 Yu, supra note 16, at 375.
50 Id.; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (prohibiting the unauthorized commercial use
of another's "name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness").
s1 Yu, supra note 16, at 378.
52 Id. at 379; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a).
53 Yu, supra note 16, at 381 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)).
54 Yu, supra note 16, at 376-77.
55 Id. at 381 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (stating that
an original work is one that is "independently created by the author"); Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (stating that an author is one to whom some-
thing "owes its origins").
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fictional persona falls within the scope of the Copyright Act, state
laws regarding right of publicity that protect a fictional persona may
be preempted.
In order for preemption to occur, the right alleged under Cali-
fornia's laws must correspond to one of the exclusive rights included
in Section 106 of the Copyright Act. Courts have developed two
different methods for determining whether an equivalent right is in-
volved.s9 Under the first approach, a state law will be preempted if a
particular act would infringe on both the state law and an exclusive
right that the Copyright Act protects, "unless the state law 'contain[s]
elements . . . that are different [] from copyright infringement.' "60
Under the second approach, a state law is preempted if it presents an
obstacle to the implementation of Congress's objectives and purpos-
es.61
III. WENDT V. HOST
Actors George Wendt and John Ratzenberger exclusively
played the roles of "Norm" and "Cliff' on the television show
Cheers. Host, which operated airport restaurants and bars, procured a
license from Paramount to recreate the Cheers setting in its airport
restaurants, including robotic figures of the characters "Norm" and
"Cliff' sitting on their usual stools at the bar. 62 The actors refused to
grant right of publicity licenses to Host.6 3  However, Paramount
claimed an exclusive right to commercially use the characters
"Norm" and "Cliff' based on its copyrights." Host attempted to alter
the appearances of the robots and changed the robots' names to
"Hank" and "Bob."65 Nonetheless, actors Wendt and Ratzenberger
claimed that Host had misappropriated their likenesses for commer-
5 Yu, supra note 16, at 381. See discussion infra Part III.
5s Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.
59 Yu, supra note 16, at 381.
60 Id. (quoting Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 810); see, e.g., Wendt I, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
5464, at *2; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d
Cir. 1983) (articulating the "extra elements" test), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
61 Yu, supra note 16, at 382 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
62 Lauri S. Thompson, The Current State of Actors' Rights in Characters they Portray,
12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 611, 613 (2001); see also Wendt H1, 125 F.3d at 809.
63 Thompson, supra note 62, at 613.
6 Id.; see also Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 811.
65 Thompson, supra note 65, at 613; see also Wendt 11, 125 F.3d at 811.
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cial gain.66
Initially, the district court granted summary judgment to de-
fendants Host and Paramount, finding that the robots Hank and Bob
were not sufficiently similar to Wendt and Ratzenberger to amount to
their likenesses under California Civil Code Section 3344.67 Howev-
er, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that "disputed issues of ma-
terial fact preclude[d] summary judgment." 68
At the outset, the circuit court acknowledged that Wendt's
and Ratzenberger's right of publicity claims were "not preempted by
federal copyright law." 69 The court stated that their claims contained
elements of invasion of personal property rights by the unauthorized
commercial use of their identities, which were different from the
elements of copyright infringement.70 Both California's Civil Code
Section 3344 and California's common law right of publicity claims
"require proof that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs 'likeness' or
'identity' was commercial, . . . whereas copyright infringement oc-
curs with any unauthorized copying of the protected material.""
Although it may seem odd that copyright law protects against
any unauthorized infringement of an original work while the right of
publicity protects only against infringement of celebrities' likenesses
for commercial purposes, the distinction can be justified by the fact
that celebrity plaintiffs, like Wendt and Ratzenberger, chose occupa-
tions that measure success by recognizability and popularity among
the public. Thus, protecting their likenesses and identities from all
copying would prevent media exposure, 72 thereby achieving the op-
posite effect of their intended goal to become popular actors.
When analyzing Wendt, Peter Yu, in his Note, Fictional Per-
sona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual Charac-
ters,73 criticizes the argument presented by actors Wendt and Ratzen-
berger "that the state created right 'contain[s] elements, such as
66 Thompson, supra note 65, at 613; see also Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 808-09.
67 Wendtl, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *3-*4.
68 Id. at *4.
61 Id. at *2.
70 Id. (citing Waits v. Frito Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992)).
71 Id. at *3.
72 Media exposure is subject to permission and fair use. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
7 Yu, supra note 16.
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invasion of personal rights.' 74 In Yu's opinion, the personae at is-
sue were Wendt's and Ratzenberger's fictional rather than human
personae, and because fictional personae are devoid of any personal
attributes, some courts would find that the state right did not contain
any additional elements that would prevent preemption by the Copy-
right Act.7 5 However, it is arguable that Yu has confused which per-
sonae truly were at issue. Wendt and Ratzenberger were not claiming
that their fictional personae as portrayed by the characters "Norm"
and "Cliff' were misappropriated, but rather their human personae as
George Wendt and John Ratzenberger were misappropriated.
The circuit court in Wendt noted that Wendt and Ratzenberger
were not attempting "to prevent Paramount from exhibiting its copy-
righted work," but rather seeking to prevent their personal rights from
being invaded.76 Although the robots were placed in Cheers themed
bars, they were neutrally named "Hank" and "Bob," and had different
facial features from Wendt and Ratzenberger.n Neither the attributes
defined as a fictional persona nor the attributes defined as a human
persona were clearly prevalent. Thus, Wendt and Ratzenberger could
just as easily have argued that the recognizability of the robots was
based on their human, rather than fictional, personae. As such,
Wendt's and Ratzenberger's claims of violations of their human per-
sonae under California's right of publicity laws would not be
preempted by federal copyright law.
In a concurring opinion in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,7 8 Jus-
tice Mosk suggested that an individual could receive protection for a
novel creation of a fictional character if the creator portrayed the fic-
tional character.79 In McFarland v. Miller,so the Third Circuit indi-
cated that while originality was an important factor, protection of fic-
tional personae under the right of publicity should be provided when
an actor's fictional persona has become so associated with the actor
74 Id. at 381-82.
7 Id. at 382.
76 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 810.
n Id. at 809-11. The circuit court's observations undermine rather than support Plain-
tiffs' claims.
7 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 432 (stating, for example, that "Groucho Marx just being Groucho Marx, with
his [mustache], cigar, slouch and leer, cannot be exploited by others").
80 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994).
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as to be inseparable .8  However, the court indicated that "an actor
becom[ing] known for a single role" would not be enough to garner
protection. 82 While the courts in Lugosi and McFarland discussed
the existence of right of publicity protection for fictional characters,
that protection was intended only when the actor had been portraying
himself, and had developed a fictional character out of his own
unique traits.83 For example, Woody Allen prevented the misappro-
priation of his "schlemiel" persona that he had cultivated through his
role in the movie Annie Hall.84 In the case of Wendt, the right of pub-
licity was asserted to protect the likenesses of Wendt and Ratzen-
berger as their human personae rather than their fictional personae.
It is unlikely that Wendt and Ratzenberger would have received pro-
tection for their fictional personae since the fictional personae were
not their own creations or portrayals of themselves, but rather the
creations of Paramount.86
The circuit court then discussed California's Civil Code Sec-
tion 3344(b), and defined "likeness" as "a visual image of a person,
other than a photograph."8 7 The court, citing White v. Samsung Elec-
tronics America, Inc., 88 stated that when determining whether an im-
age is a "likeness" under Section 3344, the image must be evaluated
without considering the context in which it appears. 89 The circuit
court noted the distinction between "likeness" and "identity" as ela-
borated in White.90 In White, the defendants aired a commercial con-
taining a metallic, mechanical robot wearing a blonde wig, which
stood in plaintiffs traditional position on a replicated set of the
Wheel of Fortune game show.91 The court in White found that when
8 Id at 920.
82 Id at 921 n.15 (stating, for example, that actor Adam West's portrayal of the fictional
character Batman did not cause his identity to merge into and become indistinguishable from
Batman, unlike Groucho Marx who was indistinguishable from his stage persona, and, there-
fore, West's mere portrayal of Batman would not be enough to warrant protection).
83 See Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 432; McFarland, 14 F.3d at 920.
8 Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
8s WendtlI, 125 F.3d at 81o.
86 Wendtl, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *1-*2.
87 Id. at *4 (citing Midler, 849 F.2d at 463; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(b) (defining "photo-
graph")).
88 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
89 Wendt 1, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *5.
9 Id. (citing White I, 971 F.2d at 1397).
9' Wendt l, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *4-*5; see also White I, 971 F.2d at 1399.
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the robot was viewed in isolation, it was not the "likeness" of Vanna
White according to Section 3344, but when considered in the context
of the game show setting, there was a "material issue of fact as to
whether the defendants had appropriated plaintiff s identity within the
common law meaning of the California common law right of publici-
ty."92 Thus, to determine whether the defendants' robots "Hank" and
"Bob" were likenesses of Wendt and Ratzenberger as defined by Sec-
tion 3344, the circuit court had to consider the images without refer-
ence to the setting in which the robots appeared.93
Upon comparison of the photographs of Wendt and Ratzen-
berger with photographs of the robots, the court "took 'judicial no-
tice' of the fact that the figures were not identical to [Wendt and Rat-
zenberger]." However, the circuit court, without addressing the
district court's judicial notice of facts, stated that the true issue was
whether the robotic "figures [were] sufficiently similar to [Wendt and
Ratzenberger] to constitute their likenesses."s The circuit court de-
termined that it could not be stated that as a matter of law the robots
were so different from Wendt and Ratzenberger that "no reasonable
trier of fact could find ... them to be 'likenesses.' "96 The court fur-
ther stated that a comparison of the actual robots and human beings
was required to make a proper determination.9 7
The circuit court additionally addressed Wendt's and Ratzen-
berger's claims of common law right of publicity and concluded that
there was unquestionably "a disputed issue of material fact."9 8 Even
though Paramount and Host argued that the setting and dress in
which the robots appeared evoked the characters "Norm" and "Cliff,"
rather than Wendt and Ratzenberger, and that "Norm" and "Cliff'
were Paramount's property, the court stated that the resemblance be-
tween Wendt's and Ratzenberger's human physical characteristics
and those of the robots was enough to produce "a disputed issue of
material fact." 99
In its analysis of Wendt's and Ratzenberger's common law
92 Wendt I, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *5; see also White I, 971 F.2d at 1399.
9 Wendt I, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *5.
94 Id. at *6.
9s Id.
96 Id.
9 Id. at *6-*7.
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right of publicity claims, the Ninth Circuit scarcely considered the
context in which the robots were displayed. 00 Although Paramount
and Host discussed the setting and dress in which the robots ap-
peared, 01 the court itself failed to consider the robots in the context
of the Cheers themed airport bars to determine whether plaintiffs'
identities were misappropriated, as the court had considered context
in the White case.102 Rather, the court merely mentioned that Wendt
and Ratzenberger had "raised genuine issues of material fact concern-
ing the degree to which the [robots] look[ed] like them."'03 Although
conceding that Wendt and Ratzenberger had valid common law right
of publicity arguments, by failing to acknowledge the context in
which the robots appeared, the court's analysis of California's com-
mon law right of publicity was nearly indistinguishable from its anal-
ysis of California's statutory right of publicity. In White, on the other
hand, the court acknowledged that the common law right of publicity
was more expansive than the statutory right of publicity because "the
[common law] right of publicity is not limited to the appropriation of
name or likeness."'04 The court in White appreciated that the identi-
ties of celebrities are not only targets for appropriation by advertisers,
but their identities are easy to appropriate by means other than name
or likeness. 0 5  Thus, the law should protect a celebrity's identity
which is a product of her own "energy and ingenuity" and has be-
come a commodity because of television and media exposure.106
While "the individual aspects of the advertisement in [White] sa[id]
little," when examined in the context of the Wheel of Fortune game
show set, there was little doubt that the advertisement meant to depict
Vanna White. 0 7 The court, in White, concluded that the identity of
100 See generally Wendt l, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464.
101 Id. at *7.
102 White !, 971 F.3d at 1399.
103 Wendtl, 125 F.3d at 811.
"m White I, 971 F.2d at 1398.
10 Id. at 1399.
106 id
107 Id Although the analysis requires consideration of the context in which the alleged
misappropriation occurred, in White and Wendt, the plaintiffs did not own the contexts. For
example, Vanna White did not own the Wheel of Fortune game show set, and in Wendt,
George Wendt and John Ratzenberger did not own the context of the Cheers bar setting. In
fact, the contexts in those cases were subject of copyright. See White II, 989 F.2d at 1517
(Kozinski, J., dissenting); Wendt H1, 125 F.3d at 811.
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Vanna White had been misappropriated.' 0 8  The court, in Wendt,
failed to undertake a similar analysis.
Finally, the circuit court addressed Wendt's and Ratzenberg-
er's claims for unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.109 Under this claim, Wendt and Ratzenberger would have to
show that " 'Host's conduct . . . created a likelihood of confusion as
to whether [Wendt and Ratzenberger] were endorsing Host's prod-
uct.' " 1o The court analyzed the eight applicable factors to determine
whether a likelihood of confusion existed."' The circuit court stated
that because it had already determined there was a disputed issue of
material fact as to the third factor, "similarity of the marks," sum-
mary judgment was inappropriate on the unfair competition claim."12
The circuit court reversed the judgment of the district court
and remanded."' On remand, the district court again granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of Host and Paramount on the claims of vi-
olations of the Lanham Act and California's statutory and common
law right of publicity.114 The district court performed its own inspec-
tion of the robots and determined that it was unable to find any simi-
larity between the robots "and the live persons of Mr. Wendt and Mr.
Ratzenberger, . . . except that one of the robots .. . [was] heavier than
the other,"-similar to the plaintiffs."'
Wendt and Host again appealed to the Ninth Circuit arguing
that the district court had erred in finding that the robots were not li-
kenesses of Wendt and Ratzenberger, because "likeness" does not
have to be "identical or photographic," and that, in any event, the jury
should make the determination rather than the court.1 6 The court
performed its own inspection of the robots and found that material is-
sues of fact existed concerning the degree of likeness between the
plaintiffs and the robots, and thus reversed the grant of summary
judgment on the claim of right of publicity under Section 3344.1"
'0 White I, 971 F.2d at 1399.
109 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 812. See supra text accompanying note 26.
1o Id. (quoting Wendtl, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *7).
"' Id at 812-14 (citations omitted).
112 Wendt l, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *7-*8.
"' Id. at *8.
114 Wendt 1I, 125 F.3d at 808-09.
"' Id. at 809.
116 Id.
"' Id. at 809-10.
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The circuit court also reaffirmed that federal copyright law did not
preempt Wendt's and Ratzenberger's right of publicity claims." 8 It
noted that Wendt and Ratzenberger were not attempting to bar Para-
mount from exhibiting its copyrighted work, but rather preventing the
invasion of their personal rights. 119
On the issue of California's common law right of publicity,
Host and Paramount argued that the robots depicted the "identities of
the characters Norm and Cliff, to which Paramount owns the copy-
rights, [rather than] the identities of Wendt and Ratzenberger, who
merely portrayed those characters on television and retain[ed] no li-
censing rights to them." 20 They further argued that Wendt and Rat-
zenberger could not base their misappropriation of identity claims on
"indicia, such as the Cheers bar sett[ing], [which was] the property
of, or licensee of, a copyright owner." 21 Wendt and Ratzenberger
agreed that they had no rights to the characters "Norm" and "Cliff,"
but maintained that Paramount's copyright of the characters "Norm"
and "Cliff' did not encompass the robots named "Hank" and "Bob,"
and that the "physical likeness to Wendt and Ratzenberger, not Para-
mount's characters [was the] commercial value to Host." 22 Wendt's
and Ratzenberger's argument suggests that in order for Paramount to
have had copyright protection over the robots, the robots should have
remained named "Norm" and "Cliff' and born a greater likeness to
their fictional personae as developed by Paramount rather than more
general characteristics.
The circuit court observed that while Wendt's and Ratzen-
berger's fame arose largely due to their participation in the television
show Cheers, they did not lose their right to prevent commercial ex-
ploitation of their likenesses by portraying the characters "Norm" and
"Cliff."' 23 The court reiterated that Wendt and Ratzenberger had
"raised genuine issues of material fact" regarding the degree of like-
ness between the robots and plaintiffs.124 The court stated that a jury
had to ultimately decide whether defendants commercially exploited
... Id at 810.
.. Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 810 (citing Wendt I, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *2).
120 Idat 811.




124 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 811.
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the likenesses of Wendt and Ratzenberger for their own financial gain
and, therefore, reversed the grant of summary judgment on the com-
mon law right of publicity claim. 2 5
Again, the court failed to consider the context of the robots in
the airports' Cheers bars when analyzing Wendt's and Ratzenberg-
er's claims of violation of their common law right of publicity. Ra-
ther than considering whether plaintiffs' identities had been misap-
propriated, the court merely stated that the issue to be addressed was
whether the defendants had commercially exploited plaintiffs' like-
nesses. 126 While the court acknowledged that plaintiffs had a valid
claim under common law right of publicity, the court failed to state
that the analysis should consider the plaintiffs' likenesses within the
context of the Cheers themed settings. When considering the robots
within the context of the Cheers settings, there is a greater possibility
of finding a misappropriation of the plaintiffs' likenesses than if the
robots were considered in isolation; plaintiffs would have a greater
chance of prevailing under their common law right of publicity
claims. 127  Therefore, the court unwittingly reduced plaintiffs'
chances of success on these claims. 128
Wendt and Ratzenberger also appealed the district court's
granting of summary judgment to Host and Paramount on their
claims of violations of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.129  The
Ninth Circuit observed that, on remand, the district court merely
"compared the robots with [Wendt and Ratzenberger] in the cour-
troom and" did not find any similarity. 130 The circuit court found that
the district court erred by failing to analyze any of the other factors
needed to determine the "likelihood of confusion [among] consumers
125 Id. at 811-12; see also Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) ("The first step toward selling a product or service is to attract the consumer's at-
tention. Because of a celebrity's audience appeal, people respond almost automatically to a
celebrity's name or picture.").
1' Wendt I, 125 F.3d at 811.
127 See, e.g., Wendt 1, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *4-*5 (stating that when the robot
in White was examined in isolation, it was not the "likeness" of Vanna White according to
Section 3344, but when considered in the context of the game show setting, there was a "ma-
terial issue of fact as to whether the defendants had appropriated plaintiffs identity within
the meaning of the California common law right of publicity.").
128 This conclusion is based on the supposition that the Ninth Circuit's analysis in White
was correct.
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as to whether [Wendt and Ratzenberger] sponsored, approved of, or
were otherwise associated with the Cheers bar[]."'al
The circuit court analyzed the factors to determine whether a
likelihood of confusion existed.132 The court observed that as to the
first factor-strength of each plaintiffs mark-in situations involv-
ing celebrities, the mark refers to the "celebrity's persona and the
strength of the mark refers to the level of recognition the celebrity en-
joys."l 33 The court found that because Wendt and Ratzenberger were
the primary players on Cheers, they were unmistakably well-known
among the target customers of Host's Cheers bars; thus, a reasonable
jury could conclude that their mark was strong.134  However, the
court's analysis of this first factor is problematic. The court, when
determining the strength of plaintiffs' marks, considered the mark to
be Wendt and Ratzenberger relative to their roles as "Norm" and
"Cliff' on Cheers.135 Thus, the court did not consider the plaintiffs'
mark as being their human identities, but rather their identities as the
fictional characters "Norm" and "Cliff." Under such an analysis, one
could question whether the mark of "Norm" and "Cliff' was really a
mark belonging to plaintiffs or belonging to Paramount, the copyright
holder of the characters "Norm" and "Cliff." If the mark actually be-
longed to Paramount, then plaintiffs' claim of violation under the
Lanham Act would fail. Alternatively, it could be argued that be-
cause Wendt and Ratzenberger had expended so much of their effort
and talent developing the characters "Norm" and "Cliff," the mark
was also very much their own. 136
This distinction is clearer within the Ninth Circuit's analysis
of this first factor in Downing v. Abercrombie.137 In Downing, defen-
dant Abercrombie & Fitch, a clothing outfitter, distributed advertising
catalogs of its merchandise; including a photograph of the plaintiffs,
professional surfers, which had been published without their permis-
131 Id.
132 Id. at 812-14.
113 Id. at 812 (citing White 1, 971 F.2d at 1400).
134 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 812.
135 id.
136 See Carson, 698 F.2d at 838-39 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that because the
phrase "Here's Johnny" was merely associated with Johnny Carson and was not part of an
identity that he created, the use of the phrase did not violate his right of publicity).
"' 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
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sion."13 The court acknowledged that plaintiffs' names and images
were highly recognizable among society, and that as "legendary sur-
fers,. . . there [was] a reasonable inference that [the plaintiffs] would
be known" by those buying from the catalogs. 139 In the case of
Downing, the celebrity plaintiffs' marks referred to their personal
identities as famous surfers.140 Similarly, in the case of White, the
court noted, when analyzing the first factor, that Vanna White was
"well-known" to the public, the audience targeted by the advertise-
ment.14 1 Again, in White, the celebrity plaintiffs mark referred to
plaintiff Vanna White's personal identity, rather than to any fictional
identity. However, in Wendt, the marks could refer to more than one
identity. The marks could refer to either "Norm" and "Cliff," the fic-
tional characters as portrayed by Wendt and Ratzenberger, or to
Wendt and Ratzenberger, as actors who had portrayed these fictional
characters. Thus, the analysis of the first factor in cases involving ce-
lebrity plaintiffs, in which the plaintiffs' identities are linked to their
portrayal of a fictional character, is not nearly as clear cut as in cases
involving celebrity plaintiffs whose identities are not intermingled
with identities of fictional characters.
The court next found that the second factor, relatedness of the
goods, also weighed in plaintiffs' favor because plaintiffs' goods,
their skill and fame as actors, were "obviously related to Host's
'goods,' " which were the Cheers bars and the products sold in them,
"even if they [were] not strictly competitive." 42 The court noted that
the source of both plaintiffs' and Host's fame was the same: the
Cheers television show.143 A jury could conclude that a customer
would "be confused as to the nature of Wendt's and Ratzenberger's
association with Host's Cheers bars and the goods sold there." 44
With respect to the third factor, the similarity of the marks,
the court concluded that a reasonable jury might find that this factor
weighed in Wendt's and Ratzenberger's favor, because they had
raised triable issues of material fact regarding "the degree to which
' Id. at 1000.
139 Id. at 1008.
140 id.
141 White I, 971 F.2d at 1400.
142 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 812-13.
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the robots resemble[d] the appellants." 4 5 The court noted that an in
camera inspection was insufficient under the Lanham Act, and that
"the district court must view the marks 'as they appear in the market-
place.' "9146 The court also found that plaintiffs offered evidence from
which a reasonable jury might infer actual consumer confusion-the
fourth factor. 147 Wendt and Ratzenberger offered evidence that they
had been approached by various people who remarked on the resem-
blance between Wendt and Ratzenberger and the robots in the airport
bars.148 Additionally, the circuit court determined that survey evi-
dence of consumer confusion submitted by Wendt and Ratzenberger,
which had been rejected by the district court, "should not have been
excluded."l 4 9 The circuit court found the district court's refusal to
admit the survey evidence to be an abuse of discretion, noting that as
long as the surveys were "conducted according to accepted prin-
ciples ..... [c]hallenges to the survey[s'] methodolog[ies]" went to
the weight given them rather than their admissibility.5 0
The court's analysis of the similarity of the marks, like its
consideration of ownership under the first factor, confused the perso-
nae at issue. Plaintiffs' evidence, that members of the public re-
marked on the resemblance between Wendt and Ratzenberger and the
robots in the airport bars, did not identify whether those members of
the public noted the similarity between the robots and Wendt and
Ratzenberger as themselves, or the robots' similarity to "Norm" and
"Cliff' as portrayed by Wendt and Ratzenberger. If the similarity be-
tween the robots and Wendt and Ratzenberger was based upon a re-
semblance to "Norm" and "Cliff," rather than to the human beings
Wendt and Ratzenberger, then plaintiffs should not prevail on this
factor, because the similarity was based on a likeness to Paramount's
copyrighted characters rather than Wendt's and Ratzenberger's per-
sonal identities.
Moreover, the circuit court found that "[t]he fifth factor, mar-
keting channels used, weigh[ed] in [Wendt's and Ratzenberger's] fa-
145 id.
146 Id. (quoting E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir.
1992)).
147 Wendt Il, 125 F.3d at 813.
148 id.
149 id.
Iso Id. (citing E. & 1. Gallo Winery, 967 F.2d at 1291; Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gi-
braltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982)).
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vor." 151The court noted a similarity in marketing channels because
Host targeted fans of the Cheers television show as customers for its
bars.152 In addition, the court found that "[t]he sixth factor, likely de-
gree of purchaser care, weigh[ed] in favor of appellants." 53 The
court stated that consumers were not expected to be careful in deter-
mining who endorsed or was affiliated with an airport bar where they
may purchase a beverage. 5 4 Further, it would be most unlikely that
consumers would analyze the source of robots, which were not for
sale and were merely used to attract customers to the bars.15 5 The
court cited its decision in White, in which it stated that "consumers
are not likely to be particularly careful in determining who endorses
VCRs, making confusion as to their endorsement more likely."1 56
Again, this analysis is faulty. The court did not discuss whether the
consumers believed that the endorsement of the airport bars was an
endorsement by Wendt and Ratzenberger as individuals, or as the
Cheers characters "Norm" and "Cliff," in which case the endorse-
ment stemmed from Paramount. In fact, if consumers were not likely
to analyze the source of the robots, one could just as easily argue that
consumers believed the source of the endorsement to be the copyright
holder of the fictional characters "Norm" and "Cliff' and not the in-
dividuals Wendt and Ratzenberger.
Upon analyzing the seventh factor, defendant's intent in se-
lecting the mark, the court found that Wendt and Ratzenberger had
alleged facts, from which it could be inferred that Host was attempt-
ing to confuse customers as to sponsorship or endorsement of the
Cheers bars.57 Wendt and Ratzenberger had submitted evidence to
show that Host intentionally designed the robots to resemble the
plaintiffs, and that Host knew that the association with Wendt and
Ratzenberger "was a major drawing card of the 'Cheers' concept." 58
Moreover, after Wendt and Ratzenberger refused to grant right of
publicity licenses to Host, "Host altered the robots cosmetically" and
renamed them from "Cliff' and "Norm" to "Hank" and "Bob," re-
151 Id.




156 Wendt 1, 971 F.2d at 1400.
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spectively, but would not recast the robots as a "friendly neighbor-
hood couple" as suggested by Paramount.159 Thus, the court deter-
mined that it could be inferred that Host intentionally exploited
Wendt's and Ratzenberger's fame by maintaining a similarity be-
tween the robots and Wendt and Ratzenberger.160 Nonetheless, by
failing to differentiate between the human personae of Wendt and
Ratzenberger and the fictional personae of "Norm" and "Cliff," the
court did not consider that Host's use of the fictional characters
"Norm" and "Cliff' based upon a license from Paramount was not an
exploitation of Wendt and Ratzenberger as individuals, but rather a
proper use of their license to portray the characters "Norm" and
"Cliff' in their Cheers themed airport bars. Host may very well have
designed the robots to look like Wendt and Ratzenberger, not as their
human personae, but as the identically featured fictional personae of
"Norm" and "Cliff," without any intention to create consumer confu-
sion.
Finally, the court found that the eighth factor, likelihood of
expansion of the product lines, weighed in Wendt's and Ratzenberg-
er's favor.16 1 The court quoted AM, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, as stat-
ing that " '[i]nasmuch as a trademark owner is afforded greater pro-
tection against competing goods, a 'strong possibility' that either
party may expand his business to compete with the other will weigh
in favor of finding that the present use is infringing.' "162 Ratzen-
berger had submitted evidence that he was inclined "to appear in ad-
vertisements for beer." 63 Consequently, the court found that because
Ratzenberger's potential future "endorsement[s] of [] beers would be
confused with his alleged endorsement of the beers sold at Host's
[airport] bars," this factor weighed in his favor. 1 64 Once again, by
failing to consider which personae were at issue, the analysis of the
likelihood of expansion of the product lines factor came up short.
Had Host intended to utilize the fictional rather than human personae
of Wendt and Ratzenberger, then the endorsement of the beers sold at
Host's airport bars would have been the endorsement of Paramount
159 Id.
160 id.
161 Id. at 814.
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and Host, the owners and licensees of the fictional personae of
"Norm" and "Cliff." Thus, Ratzenberger's future endorsement of
beer would have been unaffected. Nonetheless, the circuit court ul-
timately concluded that a jury could reasonably find "that most of the
factors weigh[ed] in appellants' favor and that Host's alleged conduct
create[d] at least the likelihood of consumer confusion," and that a
jury should determine whether appellants' Lanham Act claim should
prevail. 165
In summary, the court's analysis of Wendt's and Ratzenberg-
er's claims of unfair competition under the Lanham Act contained
many flaws. An unfair competition claim arises when a celebrity's
persona is used, causing confusion as to whether the celebrity en-
dorsed defendant's product. 166 In Wendt, when analyzing plaintiffs'
unfair competition claims, the court failed to differentiate between
the human personae of Wendt and Ratzenberger, and their fictional
personae as "Norm" and "Cliff." 67 Each factor, as analyzed by the
Ninth Circuit, considered Wendt and Ratzenberger in their roles as
"Norm" and "Cliff." However, these fictional personae that were
identified as the marks were arguably the property of Host and Para-
mount under copyright law, rather than the property of Wendt and
Ratzenberger. Had the court analyzed these factors by considering
Wendt and Ratzenberger as individuals in their own human capacity,
the result may have been quite the opposite. Thus, the court's analy-
sis of plaintiffs' unfair competition claims was flawed.
IV. LANDHAM V. LEWIS GALOOB Toys, INC.
While there are many right of publicity claims asserted by ce-
lebrities in the circuit courts,168 there are surprisingly few asserted by
165 Id. While other circuits have analyzed the likelihood of confusion as a question of
law, or as a mixed question of both fact and law, the Ninth Circuit analyzes it as a question
of fact. See Quicksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 759 (9th Cir. 2006).
166 White II, 989 F.2d at 1514-15 n.17 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
16, Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 809.
168 See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974) (involving a race car driver); Carson, 698 F.2d 831 (involving a talk show host); Ab-
dul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving a professional
basketball player); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (involving a
singer); White I, 971 F.2d 1395 (involving a game show hostess); Downing, 265 F.3d 994
(involving professional surfers); Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005)
(involving a model); Facenda, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (involving a sports broadcaster).
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plaintiffs who are actors seeking to protect their personal identities
relative to a fictional role they portrayed.169 Subsequent to Wendt,
the Sixth Circuit decided Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. ,170 in
which the plaintiff, Landham, had portrayed the role of "Billy" in
Fox's movie Predator.'7 ' Fox licensed the right to produce toys
based upon the movie Predator to toy manufacturer Galoob.172 One
of the toys was a "Billy" action figure.173 Though the figure was only
1.5 inches tall, had no mouth or eyes, and showed no similarity to
Landham, Landham claimed that the toy violated both his right of
publicity and the Lanham Act.174 Galoob argued that Landham's
claim was preempted by the Copyright Act because the movie Preda-
tor was protected by copyright.' 75  However, the court determined
that because Landham claimed that Galoob's toys evoked his person-
al identity to his financial detriment, his claim involved a right sepa-
rate from those protected by copyright law, because copyright law
does not protect a personal identity, and thus would not be
preempted.176
Upon analyzing Landham's claim that the defendants had vi-
olated his right of publicity, the court acknowledged that in right of
publicity situations, a plaintiff must show that his identity was asso-
ciated with the item in commerce, and that the association had a
commercial value.'7 7 The court suggested that the mere misappropri-
ation of the plaintiffs identity might itself indicate that the associa-
tion had a commercial value.17 8 In Landham's case, the court found
that Landham had not submitted evidence to show that the use of his
personal identity in association with the toy had a significant com-
mercial value.179 Further, the court stated that Landham's "argument
169 See, e.g., Lugosi, 603 P.2d 425; McFarland, 14 F.3d 912; Wendt1, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5464; Landham, 227 F.3d 619.
170 Landham, 227 F.3d 619.
1' Id. at 621.
172 Id. at 622.
17 id.
174 id.
175 Landham, 227 F.3d at 623. Implicit in this argument was that Fox had the right to
create derivative works, including Galoob's toys, based upon its copyright ownership of the
movie Predator.
176 Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
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[that Galoob's use of his identity was sufficient evidence of a com-
mercial value] assumes that by identifying its toy as 'Billy,' Galoob
has evoked Landham's identity in the public mind," and that assump-
tion of identification would not be enough to sustain a right of public-
ity claim. 8 0 Thus, the court found that Landham had not shown that
his personal identity had significant commercial value, or that the toy
had even evoked his personal identity.'
The Sixth Circuit discussed the difficulty a court faces in as-
certaining the point at which the identity of an actor's human persona
has become so similar to that of his fictional persona, that the actor
has a valid claim against the exploitation of his fictional persona.182
The court emphasized that even though an actor may have obtained
his fame solely through the portrayal of his fictional character, if the
public nevertheless identifies the actor with his fictional character,
then the actor has a claim for violation of his right of publicity.183
The Sixth Circuit observed that courts tend to protect plaintiffs' per-
sonae only when their human personae have become inseparable
from their fictional personae in the public's outlook. 8 4 Although the
court in Landham cited the case of Wendt to support this assertion,
the previous discussion in section III of this Comment suggests that
courts have been unable or unwilling to determine whether such "in-
separability" exists.185
The Sixth Circuit in Landham also pointedly refused to apply
the analysis of White, finding it a deviation from the rule that right of
publicity cases should focus on the actor's human persona rather than
the actor's fictional persona.186 The Landham court declared that
while the robot in White did not have similar facial features to Vanna
White's, because the robot was wearing a blond wig and comparable
clothing and jewelry to White's typical attire, and because the robot
was turning game board letters in a similar manner as White, those
factors, when observed collectively, evoked White's personal identi-
ty, even though they would not when individually observed.'8 ' The
Iso Landham, 227 F.3d at 624.
"' Id. at 624.
182 id
183 Id. at 625.
SId.
185 Landham, 227 F.3d at 625.
186 Id. at 626.
11 Id. at 625.
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Landham court explicitly disapproved of the White court's analysis,
which considered the entire context in which the possible misappro-
priation occurred.18 8 It would seem that the Landham court failed to
recognize that the White court undertook separate analyses for the
statutory and common law right of publicity claims, and that observ-
ing the entire context in which the alleged misappropriation occurred
was part of its common law right of publicity analysis. 189 In fact,
even though the Landham court observed that the right of publicity is
both a common law right and statutory right in Kentucky,190 it never
differentiated between the two in its own analysis. While the court
additionally recognized that "case law on [the right of publicity] is
exceedingly rare, both in Kentucky and nationwide, and because of
the general constitutional policy of maintaining uniformity in intel-
lectual property laws, courts typically give attention to the entire
available body of case law when deciding right of publicity cases,"'91
the court nevertheless chose not to follow the common law right of
publicity analysis utilized by the court in White. As a result, the court
failed to consider whether the "Billy" toy could, in fact, evoke Land-
ham's personal identity when all of the aspects of the toy were consi-
dered collectively. For example, it may have been possible that the
public had identified Landham's personal identity, because the toy
was named "Billy," and perhaps was dressed in similar clothing to
Landham's, had similar hair, and was packaged and sold as part of a
series of Predator movie toys. 192  Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit
stated that it would not "give every individual who appears before a
television or movie camera, . . . the right . . . to compensation for
every subtle nuance that may be taken by someone as invoking his
identity without [proof of] significant commercial value and identi-
"8 Id. at 626.
189 Just as the White court stated that California's statutory right of publicity was limited
to the appropriation of name or likeness, Kentucky's statutory right of publicity is limited to
the appropriation of name, likeness or "some element of an individual's personality." See
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(1) (Baldwin 2009). The Landham court noted that Ken-
tucky courts have not identified the right's specific elements of proof. Landham, 227 F.3d at
623 (citing Cheatham v. Paisano Publications, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 385 (W.D. Ky. 1995)).
190 Landham, 227 F.3d at 623.
191 Id. at 622 (internal citations omitted).
192 The additional facts about the appearance of the toy, such as the toy's clothing and
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fiability." 93
The Sixth Circuit also held that Landham had not proved his
federal Lanham Act claim.194 Upon applying the "eight-factor test
for determining likelihood of confusion," 95 the court found that as to
the first factor, the strength of the plaintiffs mark, because Land-
ham's prior work was geared towards adults, and he had not pro-
duced evidence that his name was recognizable among children, his
mark did not seem to have any particular strength among the toy-
buying public. 196 Unfortunately, this analysis fails to account for the
fact that adults are usually the purchasers of toys for children, and
that because Landham's prior work was geared towards adults,1 97 it is
just as likely that the adult consumers would recognize him, and that
his mark did, in fact, have strength.
Furthermore, the court found that the factors: similarity of the
marks; defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and, likelihood of
expansion of the product lines weighed against Landham, though the
court did not provide its reasoning.198 On the other hand, the court
found that the factors: relatedness of the goods; marketing channels
used; and, likely degree of purchaser care weighed in Landham's fa-
vor.199 Again, however, the court did not provide its reasoning. The
court concluded with its subjective determination that Landham had
not shown any likelihood of confusion that he had endorsed Galoob's
toy.2 00 The conclusory treatment of Landham's claim of violation of
the Lanham Act may indicate that when actors assert this type of
claim, the court's perfunctory analysis could lead to an arbitrary re-
sult.
193 Landham, 227 F.3d at 626.
194 Id. at 627.
195 id
196 Id. at 626-27.
197 Id. at 621 (stating that Landham had acted in numerous pornographic movies, in ad-
dition to acting in the movies 48 Hours, Action Jackson, and Maximum Force).
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V. APPLYING A TRADEMARK MODEL TO CASES INVOLVING
COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
In Wendt, the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether Paramount
and Host should be allowed, based on copyright ownership, to use
robots derived from the characters "Norm" and "Cliff,"20 1 or whether
George Wendt and John Ratzenberger could prevent the use because
the right of publicity prohibited the unauthorized exploitation of their
likenesses.202 Ultimately, the court did not analyze whether Para-
mount and Host should prevail on their copyright claims because it
found that copyright law did not preempt Wendt's and Ratzenberg-
er's successful right of publicity claims. 203 However, it is questiona-
ble whether defendants' copyright claims should have been dis-
missed entirely. Fairness dictates weighing both plaintiffs' right of
publicity claims and defendants' copyright claims. Moreover, it
seems that Paramount and Host were unfairly denied the right to use
the robots. It is arguable that because Paramount owned copyrights
in the characters "Norm" and "Cliff," Paramount should have been
able to license to Host the right to create robots and place them in
airport restaurants, regardless of the robots' similarity to "Norm" and
"Cliff' as well as to George Wendt and John Ratzenberger. 20 4 Be-
cause the court found that right of publicity was not preempted by
federal copyright law, 205 Paramount and Host were prevented from
exercising their exclusive right to license 206 and prepare derivative
works as guaranteed by copyright law.207 Thus, it is evident that
whenever a copyright of a celebrity's fictional persona is involved,
the copyright holder will sacrifice many of the rights guaranteed by
201 Wendt I, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *7.
202 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 809.
203 Wendt I, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *2, *6; Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 811.
204 Though Host changed the robots names to "Hank" and "Bob" after Wendt and Rat-
zenberger refused to grant right of publicity licenses, it is arguable that naming the robots
"Norm" and "Cliff' would have strengthened defendants' argument under copyright law that
the robots were a derivative work. See Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 813 (citing Sinatra, 435 F.2d at
716).
205 Id. at 810.
206 White II, 989 F.2d at 1517-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
207 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(2); see also Wendt v. Host Int'l., Inc. (Wendt III), 197 F.3d 1284,
1286. (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use of the robots in the
Cheers bars was a derivative work "just like a TV clip, promotion, photograph, poster, se-
quel or dramatic rendering of an episode").
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copyright law because of the celebrity's right of publicity. This out-
come undercompensates the copyright owner. While a celebrity's
identity and likeness are protected by the right of publicity, this result
tends to undermine the copyright owners' incentive to expend time,
money, and creativity in developing fictional characters if they are
unable to benefit further from the fruits of their labor.
However, a competing argument can be made for protecting a
celebrity's right of publicity. A celebrity expends significant time,
effort, and talent in creating unique fictional characters. As noted by
Chief Justice Bird, in his dissenting opinion in Lugosi, celebrities'
"professional and economic interests in controlling the commercial
exploitation of their likenesses while portraying [their] characters are
identical to their interests in controlling the use of their own 'natural'
likenesses." 208 Further, Chief Justice Bird noted that because a cele-
brity focuses on the development of a character for his profession, ex-
tending protection to the celebrity's character might be more impor-
tant to the celebrity than protecting his own "natural" appearance.209
In the case of Wendt, in which robots that looked like Wendt
and Ratzenberger also resembled the characters "Norm" and "Cliff,"
the question became, whose intellectual property should be pro-
tected? Should Paramount, the copyright holder of the fictional cha-
racters "Norm" and "Cliff," or Wendt and Ratzenberger, the owners
of the individual identities prevail? 210  Perhaps, putting aside the
preemption issue, the answer can be found in trademark law, which
focuses on source.211 "The purpose of a trademark is to identify and
distinguish the goods of one party from those of another." 2 12 If the
goal of trademark law is to identify and distinguish goods, trademark
analyses may determine whose goods were implicated by the use of
the robots in Wendt. Applying the analyses and reasoning found in
trademark infringement cases to this type of situation may provide a
more equitable result.
208 25 Cal. 3d at 844 (Bird, C. J., dissenting).
209 id
210 Ideally, the parties involved should provide for this contingency in their contract.
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A. Distinctiveness Analysis
One possible approach to reconciling competing claims of
copyright protection and right of publicity would be to borrow from
trademark law's "distinctiveness analysis."213 Under trademark law,
a mark is protectable when it either is "sufficiently distinctive or has
acquired secondary meaning."214 To determine whether a mark is
distinctive, the court categorizes it as either: "[G]eneric, descriptive,
suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful."215 The level of protection of a mark
depends on the category into which it falls.216
The first category consists of generic terms, which receive no
protection because they are the least distinctive and unable to distin-
guish between the goods of different producers.217 A generic term
can be said to "identify the nature of the good, rather than [the]
source." 218 The second category consists of descriptive terms, which
describe characteristics or qualities of a good, and are not protectable
unless they acquire secondary meaning. 219 The third category con-
sists of suggestive terms, which suggest, rather than describe, a cha-
racteristic of a good.220 A suggestive term requires no proof of sec-
ondary meaning in order to receive trade name protection. 22 1 The
fourth and fifth categories, "arbitrary or fanciful term[s], bear[] no re-
lationship to the product or service and [are] also protectable without
proof of secondary meaning.222
Adapting this analysis to a copyright or right of publicity situ-
ation, there could be categories of uses for which protection would
fall either with the copyright holder or with the actor depending upon
the use of the likeness. Although it is understood that in the copy-
right/right of publicity circumstances, the likeness of the individual in
213 Security Ctr., Ltd. v. First Nat'1 Security Ctrs., 750 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 1984)).
214 Id. (citing Sicilia Di R. Biebow, 732 F.2d at 425).
215 id.
216 id.
217 Colt, 486 F.3d at 705.
218 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d
638, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
219 Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1979).
220 Id.
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question is already protected under both copyright by the copyright
holder, and under the right of publicity by the actor, the analytical
framework for trademark protection would be beneficial to resolving
the competing claims and determining the prevailing party.
Hence, adapting the generic category to the copyright/right of
publicity situation would confer protection on a celebrity under right
of publicity, and the copyright holder would receive no protection
under copyright law if the copyright holder's use of that celebrity's
likeness was generic. Under this theory, rather than the generic
mark's not having a source, its source would be the celebrity. In oth-
er words, the use of the likeness would be an unquestionable copying
of the celebrity's identity, including his true name, appearance, and
traits, without utilizing any of the celebrity's fictional characteristics.
An example of a generic use in the case of Wendt would be placing
the robots at a bar, naming them "George" and "John," giving them
identical facial and bodily features to Wendt and Ratzenberger, and
dressing them in jogging suits rather than a mailman's uniform and a
business suit. This copying of Wendt's and Ratzenberger's individu-
al rather than their fictional identities, would make the individuals
George Wendt and John Ratzenberger the source of the robots be-
cause their human identity traits alone were utilized.
At the other end of the spectrum, if the use of the likeness was
in a fanciful setting, like that of the copyright holder's portrayal on
television, then the protected use of the likeness would lie with the
copyright holder as the source of the characters. For example, robots
placed in Cheers themed bars, wearing a mailman's uniform and a
business suit, and named "Norm" and "Cliff," would be a use of the
copyright holder's work, thus making the copyright holder the
source. Therefore, the copyright holder's use would be protected and
the celebrities would have no claim for infringement under the right
of publicity.
In the middle of the spectrum would fall the descriptive and
suggestive categories. For purposes of a modified copyright/right of
publicity analysis, these categories could be combined and would al-
low the copyright holder to prevail only upon acquisition of a sec-
ondary meaning. An example of this category would be robots
named "Norm" and "John," sitting at an ordinary bar, wearing a
mailman's uniform and a jogging suit. In this case, the source would
be difficult to identify because one robot is named for the actor but
2010] 381
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dressed like the television character, while the other robot is named
for the television character but dressed differently.
Applying these adapted categories to the Wendt facts, it would
seem that Host's use of the likenesses of George Wendt and John
Ratzenberger fell closer to the fanciful category. The setting in
which the likenesses are portrayed should play an important role in
determining who will receive protection of the use. In Wendt, the ro-
bots were placed in a mock Cheers setting, which was the original
use of the fictional likenesses as invented by Paramount and pro-
tected under Paramount's copyright. Had Host merely placed robots
bearing similar likenesses to Wendt and Ratzenberger at bench seats
in the middle of their restaurants, which were not decorated like the
Cheers setting, then it could be said that Host's use of the likenesses
was more generic and protection of the likenesses should fall with
Wendt and Ratzenberger. Therefore, by applying a categorical anal-
ysis of the use involved in Wendt, Paramount, the copyright holder of
"Norm" and "Cliff," would have been the source of the use involved
and should have been given protection under copyright law.
B. Dilution
Another possible method for reconciling copyright/right of
publicity conflicts would be to apply a dilution analysis. The Lan-
ham Act provides a remedy for dilution of famous and distinctive
marks.223 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA") provides
factors for determining whether a mark is famous, and defines "dilu-
tion by blurring" of marks as an "association arising from the similar-
ity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark." 224 The factors identified by the
FTDA to determine whether a mark is famous include:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of ad-
vertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised
or publicized by the owner or third parties; (ii) The
amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of
goods or services offered under the mark; (iii) The ex-
tent of actual recognition of the mark; [and] (iv)
223 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1).
224 See id. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
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Whether the mark was registered under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on
the principal register.225
Adapting the definition of dilution of marks to the realm of
copyright/right of publicity, a court would first determine whether the
fictional persona created by the copyright holder is famous and dis-
tinctive, and then would determine whether there was a lessening of
the capacity of the fictional persona to identify and distinguish goods
or services. In other words, a copyright owner would receive protec-
tion for his distinctive and famous fictional persona unless it has be-
come diluted.226
This analysis initially focuses on the copyright holder's mark
rather than a celebrity's mark.227 Once a copyright holder has estab-
lished that the mark is distinctive and famous, the mark will receive
protection unless it has become diluted. Although many may argue
that protection should begin with the individual actors, this approach
can be justified by the fact that actors voluntarily choose to capitalize
on copyright owners' creative works to further their own careers, and
that if actors would like protection for their individual personae, then
they should expend their own time and effort to create fictional cha-
racters and television shows.
Applying this analysis to the facts in Wendt, the court could
first examine Paramount's marks, "Norm" and "Cliff," and apply the
factors to determine whether those marks were distinctive and fam-
ous. For example, the court could note that under the second factor,
Paramount's show, Cheers, and the characters, "Norm" and "Cliff,"
had been on television for eleven years,228 and that "Norm" and
"Cliff' had always been integral, if not focal, parts of the program.
Further, the court could acknowledge that "Norm" and "Cliff' had
been portrayed only by actors George Wendt and John Ratzenberg-
225 Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
226 While the Lanham Act provides injunctive relief if a "person who, at any time after
the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of a mark . . . that is likely to cause
dilution ... of the famous mark," for purposes of this analysis in the copyright/right of pub-
licity situation, the relief will be provided for the copyright holder of the famous and distinc-
tive mark unless his mark has become diluted. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1).
227 In this situation, the fictional persona is the equivalent of a mark in the dilution anal-
ysis.
228 Bill Carter, Why 'Cheers'Proved So Intoxicating, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 1993, at 2.
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er;229 thus the likenesses of the fictional characters never changed.
The court could also take notice that under the third factor, the
show had been advertised during the eleven years that it ran. In addi-
tion, the court could observe under the fourth factor that the show
Cheers had become successfully syndicated worldwide. 230 Under the
fifth factor, the show Cheers, and the marks "Norm" and "Cliff,"
were shown through the medium of television. Additionally, the de-
gree of recognition of the marks, "Norm" and "Cliff," on television
was significant, and that because the show Cheers had received twen-
ty-six Emmy Awards, its popularity was evident and thus recognition
of the marks, "Norm" and "Cliff," was exceptionally likely. 23' Final-
ly, the court could discern that the characters "Norm" and "Cliff'
were copyrights owned by Paramount.232 Under this analysis, it
seems apparent that Paramount's marks, "Norm" and "Cliff," were
famous and distinctive.
After establishing that the marks were famous and distinctive,
the court would then have to determine whether the marks had be-
come diluted. In other words, the court would resolve whether there
was a lessening of the capacity of the fictional personae to identify
and distinguish the copyright protected goods or services. In the
trademark sense, the court decides whether defendant's use of the
mark blurred its product identification or harmed positive associa-
tions attached to the mark.233 To do so, the court would determine
whether consumers make a "mental association" with the copyright
holder's use of the mark and the other uses of the mark, and whether
the other uses of the mark cause a different impression of the copy-
right holder's mark.234 If so, there would be a lessening of the ca-
pacity of the copyright holder's mark to identify and distinguish his
goods or services.235
Adapting this analysis to the Wendt copyright/right of publici-
229 IMDB.com, Full Cast and Crew of Cheers, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083399/
fullcredits (last visited Jan. 2, 2010).
230 IMDB.com, Cheers Release Dates, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083399/release info
(last visited Jan. 2, 2010).
231 IMDB.com, Cheers Awards, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083399/awards (last vi-
sited Jan. 2, 2010).
232 Wendt I, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *7.
233 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 425.
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ty situation, the court would ascertain whether consumers would
make a mental association between Paramount's marks of "Norm"
and "Cliff' and actors George Wendt and John Ratzenberger. While
it is obvious that consumers would make such an association, the key
question would be whether George Wendt and John Ratzenberger in
any way caused a different impression of the copyright holder's
mark, which would decrease the association of the marks "Norm"
and "Cliff' with Paramount's show Cheers. The court could allow
both parties to present evidence to prove whether this dilution oc-
curred. This evidence would include whether actors Wendt and Rat-
zenberger had portrayed any other fictional characters on television
which would cause consumers to make other associations with their
personae in addition to "Norm" and "Cliff." Of course, if the con-
sumers initially associated the robots with Wendt and Ratzenberger
rather than with "Norm" and "Cliff," then copyright holder Para-
mount would have no claim at all.
Dilution could be observed by examining this situation with
the actress Kirstie Alley, who portrayed the fictional character, "Re-
becca Howe," on Cheers. The mark, "Rebecca," was developed five
years after the show's premiere.236 Thus, the duration of the mark
"Rebecca" was less than the duration of the marks "Norm" and
"Cliff' and perhaps had less recognition or popularity. More impor-
tantly, Alley has portrayed other fictional characters on television and
in movies, which could cause possible dilution of Paramount's mark,
"Rebecca." Prior to her acting on the show Cheers, Alley had per-
formed in a supporting role in the movie Star Trek 2: The Wrath of
Khan; had co-starred in a television series called Masquerade; and
had acted in the acclaimed miniseries North and South.237 After por-
traying "Rebecca" on Cheers, Alley went on to act in movies Look
Who's Talking, Look Who's Talking Too, Look Who's Talking Now
and in the television show Veronica's Closet.238 Of course, the anal-
ysis of dilution would occur at the time that the claimed infringement
occurred. So, in the case of Alley, the court would examine the cha-
racters that Alley depicted prior to her role as "Rebecca," and any
236 IMDB.com, Full Cast and Crew for Cheers, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083399/
fullcredits (last visited Jan. 2, 2010).
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subsequent roles she acted in until the time of infringement, to deter-
mine whether those roles caused dilution of the mark "Rebecca."
In the case of Alley, it is easier to see that consumers may not
immediately associate the mark "Rebecca" with the show Cheers, be-
cause Alley's success in other television shows and movies has
caused her persona to be identified with marks other than "Rebecca."
Because this dilution occurs when actors become successful in ave-
nues other than their roles as the copyright protected marks, the result
is fair to both the copyright holders and the actors. If an actor has ca-
pitalized on a single role of a copyright protected fictional character,
then the actor's career has developed at the expense of the copyright
holder's creativity in inventing that character. On the other hand, if
an actor is chosen to portray a copyright protected fictional character,
and has achieved fame from activities independent of the role of the
fictional character, then the copyright holder has capitalized on the
actor's fame and talent to advance its own television show. 239 This
analysis ultimately rewards either the copyright holder or the individ-
ual actor, depending upon who has created the greatest opportunity
for the advancement of the other's goods, whether those goods are
the actor's talent and fame, or the television show's popularity.
C. Secondary Meaning
Trademark law provides protection for descriptive marks that
have acquired secondary meaning.240 Secondary meaning occurs
when widespread advertising creates for consumers a connection be-
tween the mark and its source.24 ' A plaintiff must establish that a
secondary meaning existed at the time that the defendant began to use
the mark.2 42 An example of some factors to be considered in a sec-
ondary meaning analysis would include:
(1) the extent of sales and advertising leading to buyer
association; (2) length of use; (3) exclusivity of use;
(4) the fact of copying; (5) customer surveys; (6) cus-
239 This statement is equally applicable to other media besides television.
240 Vision Cr., 596 F.2d at 115.
241 Vista India v. Raaga, L.L.C., 501 F. Supp. 2d 605, 618 (D.N.J. 2007) (citing Com-
merce Nat'l Ins. Servs, Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 438 (3d Cir.
2000)).
242 Id. (citing Commerce Nat'! Ins. Serys, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 438).
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tomer testimony; (7) the use of the mark in trade jour-
nals; (8) the size of the company; (9) the number of
sales; (10) the number of customers; and (11) actual
confusion.2 43
As discussed previously, in the situation of copyright/right of
publicity conflicts, descriptive marks would be those marks that fall
in a category in between generic and fanciful.2 " The source of these
marks would be difficult to identify because both the individual ac-
tor's personal attributes and the fictional character's attributes were
utilized. Under this analysis, a plaintiff/actor would have to establish
that a secondary meaning existed at the time the copyright holder
used the mark. For example, in order to protect their individual per-
sonae, Wendt and Ratzenberger would have to show that when Host
used the robots in the airport bars, they had already established sec-
ondary meaning in the marks "Norm" and "Cliff," rendering Host's
use of the marks a violation of Wendt's and Ratzenberger's rights.
Applying the factors to determine whether secondary meaning
existed, Wendt and Ratzenberger could argue that they were adver-
tised as the characters "Norm" and "Cliff," they had portrayed the
characters "Norm" and "Cliff' for the entire eleven year duration of
the television show Cheers;245 they had exclusively played the roles
of "Norm" and "Cliff' on the television show Cheers; the robots
were nearly identical likenesses of Wendt and Ratzenberger; and cus-
tomers believed the robots were replicas of the characters "Norm"
and "Cliff' as portrayed by Wendt and Ratzenberger alone. Wendt
and Ratzenberger could further provide evidence of the number of
customers who drank at the airport bars because of the robots, which
looked like "Norm" and "Cliff," and that actual confusion occurred
because customers believed that Wendt and Ratzenberger endorsed
the airport bars because of the presence of the robots. This analysis
would protect a copyright holder's use of his protected marks unless
the individual actor could prove that a secondary meaning in the fic-
tional character marks existed, and, therefore, the individuals could
prevent the use of the fictional character marks which had become
243 Id. (quoting Commerce Nat'lIns. Servs, Inc., 214 F.3d 432,438).
244 See discussion supra Part V(A).
245 IMDB.com, Full Cast and Crew for Cheers, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083399/
fullcredits (last visited Jan. 2, 2010).
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associated with the human actors.
In fact, the Supreme Court of California performed an analy-
sis of secondary meaning in Lugosi.246 The court observed that Lu-
gosi had not used his name or likeness as the fictional character
"Dracula" in "connection with any business, product or service so as
to impress a secondary meaning on such business, product or ser-
vice. 247 The court stated that Lugosi could have created a protecta-
ble secondary meaning by commercially exploiting "his name, face
and/or likeness in connection with the operation of any kind of busi-
ness or the sale of any kind of product or service a general acceptance
and good will for such business, product or service among the pub-
lic." 248 Similarly, Wendt and Ratzenberger could have created pro-
tectable secondary meanings for their names, faces, and likenesses as
the characters "Norm" and "Cliff' by commercially exploiting them
to their own advantage. However, the facts in Wendt suggest that the
actors had not capitalized on their names, faces, or likenesses as the
characters "Norm" and "Cliff' for their commercial advantage, and
that Ratzenberger had only suggested he might do so in the future.249
While the court in Wendt analyzed the factor of likelihood of
expansion of the product lines in its analysis of the unfair competition
claims, focusing on Wendt and Ratzenberger's future commercial
exploitation of their likenesses, an analysis of secondary meaning
would examine the current and prior commercial exploitation of their
fictional personae. If Wendt and Ratzenberger had commercially ex-
ploited their fictional likenesses prior to bringing suit, then under this
analysis, they could have acquired a secondary meaning for their fic-
tional personae, which would have become more distinctive.
D. Trademark Abandonment
Another possible method for analyzing copyright and right of
publicity conflicts is by utilizing the analysis of trademark abandon-
ment. Trademark abandonment occurs when the use of the mark has
been discontinued with no intent to resume such use, or "[w]hen any
course of conduct of the owner ... causes the mark to become the
246 Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428.
247 id.
248 id
249 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 814.
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generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with
which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark." 250 In
the copyright/right of publicity situation, it can be argued that when
an actor portrays a fictional character, that the actor has abandoned
his individual likeness to that character. Once an actor has voluntari-
ly chosen to assume the role of the fictional character, the copyright
holder of the fictional character now has a valid claim to the likeness
of the actor in his fictional role. Thus, the actor's likeness no longer
uniquely identifies the actor alone, but also identifies the copyright
holder's product, which is the fictional character. Similarly, when a
trademark holder's mark has become generic, it no longer identifies
the trademark holder's product alone, and thus does not deserve pro-
tection.251
In American Thermos Products Comp. v. Aladdin Industries,
Inc., both plaintiff and defendant manufactured and sold vacuum-
insulated containers.252 Plaintiff, American Thermos, alleged that de-
fendant, Aladdin Industries, threatened to sell its containers under the
name "thermos," of which plaintiff owned eight U.S. trademark reg-
istrations. 253 Aladdin Industries argued that the terms "thermos" and
"thermos bottle" had become generic words, and thus were no longer
protectable.254 The court had to decide whether the word "thermos"
had become a "generic descriptive term for a vacuum-insulated con-
tainer" or remained a trademark which uniquely identified plaintiffs
product.255
In its analysis, the court quoted Judge Learned Hand as stat-
ing, " '[t]he single question, as I view it, in all these cases, is merely
one of fact: [w]hat do the buyers understand by the word for whose
use the parties are contending?' "256 The court noted that the evi-
dence supported the conclusion that a large majority of the consumer
public used the term "thermos" generically and that only a minority
250 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127(2) (West 2009).
251 Am. Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D. Conn. 1962),
aff'd, 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).




256 Am. Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 23 (quoting Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F.
505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)).
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of the public recognized "Thermos" as the plaintiffs trademark.257
The court then stated that it had to consider whether a finding that the
word "thermos" had become a part of the public domain would create
a likelihood that consumers would be deceived into purchasing "de-
fendant's or some other manufacturer's" vacuum insulated containers
instead of plaintiff S.258 The court concluded that the risk of confu-
sion could be eliminated by imposing "limitations and conditions []
upon the generic use of 'thermos.' "259 For example, requiring the
defendant to precede the word "thermos" with its name "Aladdin,"
and confining the use of the word "thermos" to only lower case let-
ters.260
In the case of Wendt, Paramount and Host would have the
burden of proving that Wendt and Ratzenberger had abandoned their
likenesses by assuming their roles as "Norm" and "Cliff,"26 1 which
had resulted in their likenesses becoming generic. The court would
have to first determine whether the consumers in the airport restau-
rants understood the robots to be representations of "Norm" and
"Cliff' or, rather, representations of George Wendt and John Ratzen-
berger. Wendt and Ratzenberger had presented evidence that mem-
bers of the public had approached them and commented on the simi-
larities between Wendt and Ratzenberger and the robots.262 Wendt's
and Ratzenberger's evidence did not clarify whether the public had
recognized Wendt and Ratzenberger as individuals or as their fiction-
al characters "Norm" and "Cliff." Furthermore, both parties could
submit additional evidence, by way of survey, to prove the under-
standing of the general public. Once the court determines the under-
standing of the consuming public, it would then have to decide
whether the consumers were confused as to whether Wendt and Rat-
zenberger were endorsing the restaurants.
This analysis would be similar to that performed by the court
for Wendt's and Ratzenberger's claim of violation under the Lanham
257 Id. at 22.
258 Id. at 26.
259 Id. at 27.
260 id.
261 See Electro Source, L.L.C. v. Brandess-Kalt-Aetna Group, Inc., 458 F.3d 931, 935
n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he party asserting abandonment, is required to 'strictly prove' its
claim.") (citation omitted).
262 Wendt I, 125 F.3d at 813.
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Act;263 however, it would be a more direct analysis. It would specifi-
cally address the very basic question presented by Judge Learned
Hand, " '[w]hat do the buyers understand by the word for whose use
the parties are contending?' "264 Or in this case, whom do the buyers
understand the robots to represent? If the court finds that the robots
represent Ratzenberger and Wendt in the consumers' eyes, then
Wendt and Ratzenberger should prevail. On the other hand, if the
consumers believe the robots represent "Norm" and "Cliff' in a mock
Cheers setting, then Paramount and Host should prevail. Ultimately,
the court must determine whether Wendt and Ratzenberger had aban-
doned their likenesses to their fictional characters, such that their li-
kenesses no longer uniquely identified the actors, but also identified
Paramount's products, which were the fictional characters, "Norm"
and "Cliff." This approach would achieve a just result for two equal-
ly compelling claims to the same piece of intellectual property.
CONCLUSION
Wendt has brought to the forefront the very complex problem
that occurs when copyright law clashes with right of publicity laws.
Copyright laws were enacted to protect an author from the misappro-
priation of his original creations, and to promote creativity. 265 Copy-
right laws are also meant to ensure that an author may reap the bene-
fits of his work by exploiting commercial opportunities.266 However,
these goals of copyright law may be extinguished when the copy-
righted work happens to be a fictional character who is portrayed by
an actor. When the copyright protected creation is a fictional charac-
ter, the actor who portrays the fictional character may exert his right
of publicity to protect his individual likeness, thereby preventing the
copyright holder from utilizing the likeness of the fictional character
to his own advantage. This inequitable result should be addressed.
Congress should consider revising the copyright laws or enacting a
right of publicity law in order to address this specific conflict. Alter-
natively, courts may utilize new analyses to determine whose rights
should prevail depending upon the specific facts of each case. In any
263 Id. at 812.
264 Am. Thermos, 207 F. Supp. 9 at 23 (quoting Bayer, 272 F. at 509).
265 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a); Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526.
266 Yu, supra note 16, at 387. See also Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526.
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event, as the laws stand today in most circuits, the mug of copyright
holders is only half full.
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